whieh goes back more than seventy years to 1927 when a committee of experts constituted by the League of Nations decided to put the subject on the agenda of the Codification Conference of 1930, with very little success. 3 As for the ILC, it put the subject on the agenda in 1955 4 before finally completing its investigation fort y-six years and five Special Rapporteurs 5 later. Amongst the many problems encountered in this drawn-out enterprise, the question of the unit y or plurality of regimes of responsibility is without doubt one of the most difficult that the Commission had to address . There is no doubt that, besides the general fUIes applicable to the situation created by the occurrence of an internationally wrongfu1 act, there are specific regimes of responsibility whieh replace these rules,6 complement them or partially depart from them. But much more delicate and controversial is the question of knowing whether certain breaches entail (de lege loto) or should entail (de lege ferenda) specifie consequences addition al or alternative to those under general law.
1. This is a new tille. The draft was previously entitled: 'State responsibility'. This late but welcome change has the merit of clearly distinguishing, in languages other than English, responsibility for a wrongful act from liability for harmful consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by internationallaw.
2. By its resolution 56/83 adopted without a vote on 12 December 2001, the General Assembly 'takes note of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, presented by the International Law commission, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution, and commends them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action' (para. 3).
3. Cf., C. Rousseau, Droit international public, Vol. 1, Introduction et sources (Paris, Sirey 1971) p. 358 or A. Pellet, 'Remarques sur une révolution inachevée: le projet d'articles de la C.D.I. sur la responsibilité des Etats', 42 AFDI (1996) p. 7.
4. See the summary of the first stages of the examination of the subject in [LC Yearbook (1969) Vol. n, pp. 135-138, paras. 64-84.
5. In chronological order: Frederico V. Garcia Amador (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) , Roberto Ago (1963 Ago ( -1979 , Willem Riphagen (1980 Riphagen ( -1986 , Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (1987 -1996) and James Crawford (1997 -200 1).
6. It is possible to speak in this case -but only in this case -of self-contained regimes; on this point see note by B. Simma, 'Self-Contained Regimes', 16 NYIL (1985) pp. 111-136, or Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Third Report on the responsibility of States, in ILC Yearbook (1992) Vol. II, Prut One, pp. 32-33, paras. 84- 88. Ago implicitly answered in the affirmative when he had the celebrated Article 19 of the draft articles adopted by the Commission in 1976 7 and confirmed in 1996,8 in both cases unanimously, and in the following terms: ' 1. An act of aState which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subject-malter of the obligation breached.
2. An internationally wrongful act which resuIts from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime. 3. Subject to paragraph 2 and on the basis of the rules of internationallaw in force, an international crime may resuIt, inter alia, from: a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting aggression; b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination; c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid; d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environ ment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas. 4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not a international crime in accordance with paragraph 2 constitutes an international delict.,9
Adopted twenty years later, articles 51-53 of the 1996 draft lO were based on this concept with a rich potential of consequences but the actual consequences that these articles drew from the notion may seem extremely disappointing, to the point that an argument was derived from it to 'kill crime>!l as if, from the fact 7 . See the fifth reportofR. Ago on theresponsibility of states, in ILC Yearbook 1976, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 24-54, paras. 72-155, and the report of the Commission, ibid., Part Two, pp. 95-122.
8. The draft articles on the responsibility of states adopted at the first reading by the ILC is reproduced in the report of the Commission on its 48th session in ILC Yearbook (1996) that a mountain had given birth to a mouse, it was necessary to flatten the mountain ...
Happily the draft adopted at the second reading in 2001 does not entail such a drastic consequence: if the word 'crime' has been carefully banished from the text, the substance still remains (2); and if the consequences which have been specifically derived from it are fairly innocuous, in the eyes of sorne, the draft, thanks to the 'safeguard clauses' with which it is liberally sprinkled, reasonably preserves the future (3).
THE WORD AND ITS SUBSTANCE 'CRIMES' OR 'SERIOUS BREACHES'?
2.1 What's in a word ...
A noticeable feature of the 2001 draft is the complete absence of the word 'crime' which does not appear a single time. Even more than that: Part One, dedicated to 'intemationally wrongful acts', does not contain a single provision that is even remotely similar to the previous Article 19.
In an article co-authored with two of his assistants, Professor Crawford gives an explanation for this disappearance which is, in essence, generally convincing except at the level of terminology: 'Part One proceeds from the idea that intemationally wrongful acts of aState form a single and same category and that the criteria which are applied to these acts (in particular those related to attribution and to circumstances precluding wrongfulness l2 ) are independent of any distinction between 'delictual' and 'criminal' responsibility. 13 This vocabulary, however, demonstrates that the ILC Special Rapporteur does not understand -or refuses to understand -the full significance that Ago and the other authors of the draft in the first reading gave to the word 'crime' which, in their mind, was devoid of any 'penal' connotation.
As has been very weIl demonstrated by Professor Marina Spinedi, the Commission did not have the slightest intention 'to attach to these acts forms of responsibility similar to those provided in the criminal law of modem domestic legal systems' .14 But, despite the very clear indications in this direction given by the ILC in the Commentary on the first reading of draft article 19,15 Crawford has not maintained any less firmly his opposition to the word 'crime', in relying quite wrongly on analogies with internaI law 16 even though he recognized explicitly that '[the] idea that responsibility in internationallaw is neither "civil" nor "criminal" but simply "international" is scarcely contested' . 17 The ILC Special Rapporteurs clearly play a pro minent role, at least within the framework of the subjects for which they are in charge. 18 There was, therefore, little chance that the Commission would pay no heed to the determined opposition of its Special Rapporteur, even if this opposition happened to be based on a very controversial argument. AlI the more because Crawford's opposition to the word 'crime' was along the same lines as that of several states 19 and of part of the literature 20 and because, if the term has its virtues, it also has disadvantages.
Included in the first category is, above aB, usage -a usage on which the Commission relied in 1976 and that its draft has, in turn, reinforced. As the ILC Commentary on the previous article 19 shows, several conventions use the word 'crime' to refer to the most serious assaults upon the international legal order: genocide, apartheid, aggression, etc. 21 and, as criticized as it has been, the word has become adopted in internationalist literature. Furthermore, it has the merit of stigmatizing the forms of behaviour to which it refers, behaviour which constitutes the most serious attack 'upon the fundamental interests of the international community'.
On the other hand, this terminology has undeniably a criminal connotation and is, therefore, misleading as, quite clearly, international responsibility is neither civil nor criminal, but sui generis, peculiar to public international law, like administrative responsibility is peculiar to domestic public law (and even if, in these two cases, the analogies with civil law are undoubtedly more pronounced than those that can be made with criminal law). Indeed, this 'criminal' connotation is not unacceptable as it concerns actual crimes that threaten the cohesion of the international community in its 'hard core', which is limited to a very small number of essential values, and which allow one to talk of 'community'. Conversely, to qualify as a 'delict' any internationally 16 wrongful act which is not a crime, as was the case in paragraph 4 of the previous article 19, was obviously open to criticism: even if 'civil delicts' exist, the word conveys a clear sense of criminallaw, even though the cohesion of the international community is not su ch that one can assume that it is interested in the repression of these acts. The breach of a bilateral trade treaty does not imply any attack upon the interests of the 'international community as a whole' -it is a bilateral affair that must be settled, and cannot be settled but in a purely bilateral framework; actio popularis is inadmissible here. In this respect, the dictum of the ICJ in the South-West Africa case remains as convincing today as it was in 1966.
22 But this does not affect states' crimes, as the Court recognized in its celebrated corrigendum to this quite categorical position four years later:
'an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of aState towards the international community as a who le, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatie protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of aIl States. In view of the rights involved, aIl States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes,?3
The dichotomy between crimes and delicts had the advantage of clearly making this distinction; but it had the disadvantage of evoking concepts more familiar to a criminal than an internationalist approach.
A simple manner of resolving the problem could have consisted of abandoning the word 'delict' (by deleting paragraph 4 of the previous article 19) while maintaining the term 'crime', a course of action infinitely less open to criticism. However, in accordance with its Special Rapporteur, the International Law Commission, without any significant opposition, came round to accepting a more radical solution: there would be no mention of crimes nor delicts, and these words which cause anger would be replaced by their definition.
However, it was necessary neither 'to throw out the baby with the bathwater' nor, using the pretext of the consensus on terminology, to abandon an indispensable concept, even recognising the relative cohesion of the international community, as limited as it is at the present time. 22 . In its Judgment of 18 July 1966, the Court refused to 'allow the equivalent of an actio popularis or right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a public interest. But although a right of this kind may be known to certain municipal systems of law, it is not known to intemationallaw as it stands at present' (lCl Supported with eagerness by the members of the Commission who, not without reason, saw this as an opportunity to postpone indefinitely a concept that they condemned or did not understand, this proposaI was unacceptable to those who could not conceive of genocide and the innocuous breach of a trade treaty being placed at the same level and subject to the same legal regime.
Following a debate 27 that was sometimes passionate but which scarcely added anything new to debates already widely reported in the literature 28 the Commission had to take note 'that no consensus existed on the issue of the treatment of 'crimes' and 'delicts' in the draft articles, anq that more work needed to be done on possible ways of dealing with the substantial questions raised. It was accordingly agreed that: (a) without prejudice to the views of any member of the Commission, draft article 19 would be put to one side for the time being while the Commission proceeded to consider other aspects of Part One; (b) consideration should be given to whether the systematie development in the draft articles of key notions such as obligations erga omnes, peremptory norms (jus cogens) and a possible category of the most serious breaches of international obligation could be sufficient to resolve the issues raised by Article 19; .. , '29 The serious drawback to this delay solution was that, once more, the Commission was postponing its decision on the question of the duality of the legal regimes applicable to internationally wrongful acts. There was, therefore, a risk of falling back into the pitfalls of the first reading: the former Special Rapporteur, Professor Arangio-Ruiz had examined the consequences of wrongfuI international acts in an undifferentiated manner, without distinguishing between consequences of crimes on one hand and those of offences on the other, resulting in a 'telescoping' between the two regimes and in serious lacunae in the regime of crimes. 30
This was also the mode of operation of his successor, who waited two years (and the last year of his mandate) before tackling again head-on, in his fourth and final report,3l the question of international crimes of the state. Meanwhile, the Commission had adopted the essence of his draft without concerning itself with the possibility of a regime of responsibility particular to the most serious breaches of internationallaw.
It is true that in the previous year 2000, Professor Crawford had opened the way to a solution when he asked whether 'further consequences [i.e., further to those usually associated with an internationally wrongful act] could again be brought under the category of gross, egregious and systematic breaches of obligations to the international community as a whole' .32 He answered in the affirmative by holding that 'if one leaves aside the controversial terminology of 'crimes', [the consequences derived from crimes by articles 52 and 53 of the draft adopted at the first reading] are broadly acceptable .. ,' .33 It was a partial and disguised 'conversion' to the concept of crime, except for the word itself, and on this basis the Drafting Committee adopted, provisionally, draft articles 41 and 42, which constitute Chapter III of Part Two of the Draft on the 'Contents of the international responsibility of States', replacing the previous articles 51 and 53 of the 1996 draft. 34
The word 'crime' was carefully avoided. But this chapter had to be applied 'to the international responsibility which is entailed by an internationally 29. ILC Report on the proceedings of its fiftieth session, supra para. 331. wrongful act that constitutes a serious breach by a state of an obligation to the international community as a whole and essential for the protection of its fundamental interests' .35 This formula constituted a very acceptable definition of international crimes of astate; it allowed retention of the substance while getting rid of the word.
Although the plenary Commission was not able to examine the draft articles provisionally adopted by its Drafting Committee, it decided to publish them in its report as an appendix to the chapter devoted to responsibility36 in order to allow the representatives of states to respond during the debates of the Sixth Commission of the General Assembly.
In so doing, the Commission was taking a risk to re-open the debate on international crimes of states, which indeed happened: the subject was widely debated and again the concept was fiercely contested by certain governments. 37 On the basis of the se reactions, the Special Rapporteur recommended retaining Chapter III of Part Two while revising it 'thoroughly' . 38 It is difficult to agree that this is what he actually proposed and what the Commission did. The draft articles definitively adopted in 2001 39 differ, in effect, only marginally from those provisionally adopted by its Drafting Committee in the previous year. Putting aside several purely editorial changes, the only significant changes are twofold: -in the first place, the very title of the chapter (and, consequently, the wording of paragraph 1 of the new article 40 -which replaces article 41 of 2000) has been modified again: from 'Serious breaches of essential obligations to the international community as a whole' to 'Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general internationallaw'; -in the second place, the possibility of aggravated or punitive damages in the case of breaches of this type is no longer included in the draft. This omission will briefly be commented upon below. 40 As far as the first change to the final draft is concerned, it really is fundamentally'cosmetic'. It is basically another way of saying more or less the same thing: besides 'ordinary' breaches of international law of which only the direct victims are justified in making a complaint, there are breaches of a particular seriousness which put at 35 . Draft article 41, para. 1. 36. ILC Report on the proceedings of its 52nd session, op. cit. n. 34, at pp. 124-140. 37. See the thernatic summary of the debates, A/CNA/5l3, paras. 89-121; the rnost determined opposition came from the large Western countries with the no. peril the essential interests of the international community as a whole and which cali for separate reactions on the part of ail members of this community. The explicit reference to peremptory norms of general international law in the new version of Chapter III of Part Two of the draft is not without advantage. The concept of jus cogens, while much disputed in the past, is now very generally accepted. 41 Besides, the approach retained by the Commission has the merit of shedding light on the uniqueness of the concept and the multiplicity of its consequences which are not limited to treaty law.
There is, however, a drawback: the draft articles definitively adopted by the ILC do not define what must be understood by a 'peremptory norm of general international law'. From this fact, one is led, implicitly but undoubtedly, to the concept of jus cogens appearing in article 53 of the Vienna Convention of 1969. This provision has three unfortunate characteristics in regard to responsibility: -in the first place, the 1969 text defines peremptory norms only in terms of their consequences in matters of treaty law, which is not very rational from the standpoint of the law of international responsibility: that amounts to saying that when a rule renders a conflicting treaty invalid, its breach entails particular consequences in matters of responsibility; this is a not very useful combination of two quite distinct branches of law;42 -in the second place, for many authors, the concept of jus cogens has, in addition to its 'social' content, a 'Iogical' dimension; it covers not only the rules which constÏtute the foundations, the cement, of the international community but also those without which no legal system would be conceivable and, in the first place, the princip le pacta sunt servanda; it is clear that only the first are relevant as far as the legal regime of international responsibility is concerned;43 -in the third and final place, the 1969 definition refers to the 'international community of States as a whole' when, in the ILC draft articles, it is only a question of the international community as a whole -'full stop';44 one can argue that since the adoption of the Convention of Vienna, the concept of international community has been expanded; in any case, this dichotomy is not one of the happiest and the co-existence of two distinct 'international communities' in the draft is a source of confusion.
Despite this, the 2001 draft is certainly moving in the right direction. It omits the 'red rag' which the word 'crime' constituted and deprives authors and states of terminologie al arguments which were based upon this word -arguments used to oppose the necessary duality of regimes of responsibility, depending on whether the internationally wrongful act affects the particular interests of one or several given states or those of the international community (of states?) as a whole. It thus preserves the basic achievements of the 'revolutionary' approach of Roberto Ago who succeeded in having included that international responsibility was not the situation resulting from damages caused by an internationally wrongful act but due to this act itself, thereby 'objectifying' the system of international responsibility. 45 Moreover, while taking note of the existence of the two categories of breaches, the new ILC draft confines those relating to obligations under peremptory norms of general international law within narrow limits which must be approved: they derive from the limited degree of integration and solidarity which characterizes the international community. This is the reason why the Commission has not submitted ail the breaches of obligations arising under the rules of jus cogens 46 to an aggravated regime of responsibility: the only obligations falling under the remit of Chapter III of Part Two are serious breaches of these obligations and paragraph 2 of article 40 states: ' A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fu!fil the obligation. ' It is clear that any act of torture is morally and legally reprehensible and constitutes the breach of a peremptory norm. 47 The fact remains that an isolated 44. See Art. 33, para. 1 ('The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of the international obligation breached and on the circumstances of the breach') and Art. 48, para. l(b» ('Any State other than the injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: ( ... ) (b) The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole' .
45. Cf., Pellet (1996) op. cit. n. 30, at pp. 7-32, in particular pp. 10-13. 46. The ILC is correct to speak of breaches of 'obligations' and not of 'norms'; the norms do not cause any obligation which could give birth to an internationally wrongful act -cf., Art. 2(b) of the draft.
47. Il also gives place to the international criminal responsibility of the individual who is the perpetrator -cf., the judgment of the Chamber of first instance of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia of 10 December 1998 in the case Furundzija, IT-95-l7/l-T, which defines the act of torture does not threaten the foundations of the international legal order, unlike the systematic and gross use of torture, even if the state only employs (or tolerates) it for purely domestic purposes without relation to an international conflict. Hénce, in a well known case, France was convicted for torture by the European Court of Human Rights;48 independently of one's opinion on how well-founded this conviction was, France would certainly not be characterized as a 'criminal' state (in the sense of the previous article 19 of the 1976 ILC draft). This isolated act, which occurred in a police station and was insufficiently punished by the French courts, as reprehensible as it was, does not constitute a gross nor systematic breach of an obligation under a peremptory norm of general internationallaw such as, undoubtedly, would include torture;49 the international community was not destabilized as a result of this act. It is a different matter when the breach involves systematic policies characterized by contempt for human rights such as those put in practice in recent times in the Chile of Pinochet, the Argentina of the military dictatorship or, today, in China, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Sorne people will not fail to be astonished, or ev en indignant, that the ILC draft con tains no provision for any means whatsoever of establishing the fact of these serious breaches.
A proposaI along these lines, based on article 66 of the Convention of Vien na, was made during the discussion at the first reading of the draft articles on the responsibility of states. so Due to a lack of time and will, the ILC postponed examination of the proposaI until the second reading. Discussion of this proposaI was not resumed on this occasion. This wou Id anyway hardly have had any point given that the Commission decided not to recommend formally to the General Assembly that its draft articles be adopted as a convention.
S1
In any case, such a provision does not appear indispensable: the object of the draft is to de scribe the basic mIes (of a 'secondary' nature) applicable to the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. The implementation of these mIes cornes under the same mechanisms, and is submitted ta the same mIes, as any norm of general internationallaw: 'Under the mIes of present-day internationallaw ( ... ) each state establishes for itself its legal situation vis-à-vis other States ,52 and the absence of a judicial assessment is the mIe rather than an exception. It is not, for that matter, without interest ta note that Article 66 of the prohibition of torture as a norm which is peremptory erga amnes (paras. 151-157).
48 
Convention of
on responsibility, they will always be at liberty to in sert a comparable provision -experience shows that it is of limited interest.
54
Like 'international crime of the State', from which it is distinguished only by the name (or the absence of any particular denomination), the concept of a 'serious breach of an obligation under a peremptory norm of general international law', reflects the idea that there are 'fundamental interests of the international community' which it is advisable to safeguard in a special way. It is what articles 19 and 51 to 53 of the 1996 ILC draft attempted to do; it is also the objective pursued by articles 40 and 41 of the 2001 draft. Both drafts cautiously recognize the limited but comforting advances of 'communitarian' sentiment and of solidarity in the global international community, as had already been done, in their own way, by articles 53 and 64 of the Convention of Vienna. 55 With or without the name, definitely, 'Vive le crime!' .56
3.
WHAT IS SAID AND NOT SAID -THE CONSEQUENCES OF 'CRIMES'

What is said
One can congratulate onèself that the ILC did not allow itself to be intimidated by the pressure to which it was subjected by a handful of powerful and influential states and, in accordance with its mission, has maintained, as an integral whole, the project of codification (more than of progressive development) for which it has been responsible and which would have been seriously truncated and unbalanced by the deletion of provisions relating to serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. 57 But equally so, one is forced to note that the explicit consequences that it 53. The author of this article is in favour of allowing the ILC draft articles 'to live their life' for several years before undertaking, if necessary, their adoption as a convention: lime will permit the passions that sorne of its provisions (in general, the most 'progressive') still excite to wane, and to separate 'good law from bad'.
54. On this point, the author has changed his position from that expressed several years ago in another article (cf., Pellet (1997) op. cit. n. 30, at pp. 294-296).
55. It is striking that the draft articles on responsibility adopted in 2001 make several references to the concept ofperemptory norms of general internationallaw; in addition to Arts. 40 and 41, see Arts. 26 and 50, para. l(d).
56. See supra n. 31. 57. Il goes without saying lhat, in the process of codification entrusted to the Commission, the states have the last word which is as it should be. But the ILC has the right and the dut Y to propose to the states, completely independentiy and in ail conscience, drafts which are complete, consistent and take into consideration changes in the international community and its law. What happens subsequently with has drawn from this concept are, at least in part when sticking to the text of the draft, deceptive and incomplete.
Although he proclaimed his intention of reviewing 'thoroughly' the previous draft articles 51 and 53 dedicated ta the consequences of international crimes of states,58 the Special Rapporteur, J. Crawford No doubt, this provision is more 'sober' than those which it is replacing. But the changes are more apparent than real.
In comparison with the 1996 draft:
-the previous article 51 59 has disappeared from the 2001 text; but, clearly, the first part of the sentence of paragraph 3 of the new article 41 fulfils the same function and the expression 'particular consequences' in the title of this provision also provides the same; -similarly, the previous article 52 60 has not been maintained: but Special Rapporteur Crawford clearly demonstrated in his third report that the article was superfluous; he indicated firmly that there was no reason for making, in this regard, a distinction between the consequences of 'crimes' and those of other ils drafts is no longer ils own business.
58. See supra n. 38. 60. 'Where an internationally wrongful act of aState is an international crime: (a) an injured state's entitlement to obtain restitution in kind is not subject to the limitations set out in subparagraphs c and d of article 43 [according to which the restitution would not involve a burden out of ail proportion to the benefit which the injured State would gain from obtaining restitution in kind instead of compensation or would not seriously jeopardize the political independence or economic stability of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act]; (b) an injured State's entitlement to obtain satisfaction is not subject to the restriction in paragraph 3 of article 45' (which prohibits the injured State from formulating 'demands which would impair the dignity of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act') -text ibid. internationally wrongful acts: 61 basicaIly, the limitations in the previous provisions relating to the forms of reparation, to which article 52 was meant to derogate (and that the new project somewhat diminished), rested on the idea of proportionality (there was a desire to avoid a situation in which the reparation would entail a cost out of proportion to the damage sustained or the seriousness of the breach); moreover, as it concerns a matter of 'crimes', whereby the breaches are, by definition, particularly serious, this proportionality can be considered as being 'put up a notch'; there is no reason for necessarily abandoning this condition; -finaIly, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the new article 41 are to the same effect, though in a more precise form which is undoubtedly less open to controversy than what was stated in the previous article 53.
Although it has been indicated as such in the literature,62 the consequences were not so innocuous.
The obligation to cooperate in order to put an end to 'serious breaches'63 is quite a specific consequence of serious breaches: it has never been claimed that the solidarity among states is sufficiently solid to impose upon them a (positive) dut y of cooperation to put an end to any internationally wrongful act whatever its nature. The structure peculiar to the international community, initially composed of juxtaposed sovereignties, evidently precludes such an obligation. 64 The obligation which is recognized in paragraph 1 of Article 41 is therefore, symbolically at least, in contradiction with classical international law and is in conformity with the (modest) advances of international solidarity. Moreover, it bears an indispensable guarantee: by invoking that aIl states must cooperate, 'by lawful means', to put an end to serious breaches, it precludes the use of armed force in a manner contrary to the United Nations Charter, which should reassure those who could fear that the article legitimizes 'Zorro style' operations of the type led by NATO in Kosovo. 65 The 64. Which, for that matter, does not exist in internallaw either from which it is excluded by the idea that no one is supposed to mete out justice to himself; conversely, at the heart of the state, citizens have an obligation to cooperate with the forces of order and justice (as states must lend their aid to the Security Council in the excercise of its principal responsibiIity in the matter of maintaining peace and international security), but this is no longer a problem of the law of responsibility but of maintaining pubic order.
65. The current author is not convinced, in the circumstances in which it took place, that the NATO operation cannot be seen as lawful (see A.Pellet 'La guerre du Kosovo -Le fait rattrapé par le droit', 1 Forum du Droit international (1999) pp. 160-165).
not recognising as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law, and of not rendering aid or assistance in its maintenance, are no longer deprived of their signifïcance. The first more than the second assuredly, the latter simply being, in principle, the consequence, or the continuation, of the obligation stated in paragraph 1.
It has been asserted that the obligation of non-recognition was not specifie to situations resulting from 'crimes' .66 This is not right: certainly, astate not directly injured by an 'ordinary' internationally wrongful act has no say in recognising a situation created by such an act. But the reason is that the situation concerns exclusively the responsible and the directly injured states, this other state is 'not concerned'; it is a third party in relation to the situation and does not have to take a position in this regard. 67 On the other hand, it goes without saying that the injured state is perfectly within its right to forget the past and to recognize, if it wishes, the harmful consequences of a breach of which it is the victim. As Antonio Cassese writes: 'under the "old" law [still in force regarding "ordinary" internationally wrongful acts] the consequences of international delinquencies were only a "private business" between the tortfeasor and the claimant'.68 Moreover, article 20 of the draft states that 'valid consent by aState to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State ... ' and article 45, of which the logical connection with the previous article is nothing less than obvious, declares that:
'The responsibility of aState may not be invoked if: (a) the injured state has validly waived the claim' This consent or waiver must, of course, be 'valid', which means, in particular, that it must not concern the commission of an act contrary to an obligation deriving from a rule of jus cogens. The exact purpose of this article is, in effect, to protect weak states against themselves or against the pressures to which they are submitted by more powerful states. It is for this reason that a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law is rendered absolutely void by Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. It is also why a state which is a victim of a serious breach of an obligation arising under such a norm may not elect to waive, even voluntarily or in matters concerning it, its right to invoke the responsibility of the perpetrator.
Furthermore, the situation appears totally different from that resulting from 'ordinary' breaches of internatiomillaw. In the case of 'serious breaches', the circle of interested states is no longer limited to the state (or states) responsible, on one side, and to the injured state (or states) on the other; aIl the members of the 'international community of states as a whole' are concerned. The breach 'has become a "public affair" involving not only the two parties directly concerned but also the world community at large' .69 Consequently, the direct victim(s) of the breach wou Id undermine the collective interests of this who le by waiving the right to invoke the responsibility of the author of the breach, the implementation of which interests the entire international community.
It is in this regard that the distinction employed in Chapter These prerogatives are not limited to cases of serious breaches of peremptory norms of general international law. They are nevertheless open to this hypothesis, which very likely represents that in which states'6ther than the injured state' are most inclined to act, as a certain number of precedents have clearly demonstrated. 74 At the same time, the distinction between 'serious breaches' on one hand (Art. 40) and the other breaches on the other hand (Art. 48, sect. 1 (b)) of peremptory norms of general internationallaw is justified: the former involves consequences which are added not only to those of 'ordinary' internationally wrongful acts (the 'crimes' of art. 19 of the 1996 draft), but also to those of breaches of obligations arising under the rules of jus cogens which cannot be qualified as 'serious' within the meaning of article 40 of the project.
These 'concentric circles' of responsibility perhaps complicate a little the issues. However, given that these various hypotheses do correspond to the great variety of actual situations, their consideration by the ILC project is a cause for congratulation.
3.2
What is Dot said
The fact remains that the ILC Articles are far from describing, even de Lege Lata, aU the consequences deriving from serious breaches of a peremptory norm of general internationallaw. Still, it is necessary to give credit in this regard to the Special Rapporteur who, in his third report in 2000, attempted to relax somewhat the 'constricted' conception of these consequences as they were presented in the draft adopted at the first reading. He argued for the inclusion in the draft of two new elements of which at least the second was a considerable advance: -firstly, Professor Crawford proposed 'that in the case of gross breach of community obligations, the responsible State may be obliged to pay punitive damages' ; 75 -secondly, he suggested that a provision be made for the possibility for 'any other State reparation in the interests of the victims' .76
In the two cases, the Drafting Committee foIlowed his suggestions, at least in part.
Article 42, paragraph 1, of the draft provisionaIly adopted by this committee in 2000 actuaIly provided that:
'A serious breach within the meaning of article 41 may involve, for the responsible State, damages reflecting the gravit y of the breach'. 77
This was certainly a rationalisation compared with the 1996 draft which contained a comparable provision in article 45 but which was dedicated to satisfaction as a means of reparation of aIl internationally wrongful acts 78 and not of crimes in particular. Yet, if the idea of punitive damages is not weIl established in positive internationallaw,79 it is entirely inappropriate with regard to 'simple' breaches of international law, not having a particularly serious character. It was therefore moved to the chapter specific to the consequences of serious breaches.
The fact remains that this idea of punitive damages has a criminal connotation which tallies poorly with the instinctive rejection by the Special Rapporteur, a number of states and members of the Commission of aIl 'criminal drift,.80 This is undoubtedly why, in 2001, Crawford denied that the provision was related to punitive damages contrary to what he had stated the previous year,81 white, at the same time, defending the retention of this provision in the draft. 82 His position was not adopted by the Drafting Committee which, after a lively debate, decided to delete the provision, a move which was subsequently approved by the plenary Commission. It is not clear whether this deletion should be regretted: the 'decriminalisation' of the draft should probably be taken to its logical conclusion. 83 In any case, this provision would have consisted of a progressive development of international law to which the states had shown quite significant reticence 84 and which was not indispensable (or which, in any case, would have been worthy of a more thorough study than those presented by the two last Special Rapporteurs on the topic).
Much more regrettable is the deletion, in the final draft, of draft article 54 which had been provisionaIly adopted in 2000 by the Drafting Committee in accord an ce with the suggestion by Professor Crawford mentioned above. Paragraph 2 of this short-lived provision was as follows: 'In the cases referred to in article 41 [i.e., in the case of a serious breach of essential obligations to the international community], any State may take countermeasures, in accordance with the present Chapter, in the interest of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached'. 8S This text probably concerned the recognition of the most important consequence of 'serious breaches'. It was perfectly logical: once aIl the states have an interest in an obligation essential to the international community to which they belong, it is legitimate that they are in a position to ensure that this obligation is complied with. It would be vain to pretend that the UN Security Couneil could ensure such compliance: -on the theoretical level, the law of international responsibility and that of the Charter or, more widely, that of maintaining peace and international security are two distinct branches of internationallaw and the draft articles on responsibility must be sufficient in themselves -even if it is speeified, as do es article 59, that theyare 'without prejudice to the United Nations Charter'; -on the practicallevel, one cannot but think of the parable of the blind leaning on the paralysed: by not granting to states the possibility of reacting individuaIly (or collectively) they must rely entirely on the mechanisms of the Charter and, consequently, on the pleasure of the Security Couneil and its permanent members; if genocide is committed or apartheid is instituted, the states must remain with their arms crossed in the face of Council inaction; this is the institutionalisation of Munich! Moreover, draft article 54 of 2000 gave guarantees against abuse: -the right of non-injured states to take countermeasures was limited to that of acting 'in the interest of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached', in particular persons or peoples whose fundamental rights had been flouted, and not in their own interest; -these countermeasures must respect the limits placed upon aIl response to unlawfulness in regard to their object (draft articles 50 and 51) and to their conditions (article 53), in particular as regards the fundamental demand of proportionality (article 53); -paragraph 2 of draft article 54 required states taking, jointly or coIlectively, 85 . Text in the ILe Report on the proceedings of the 52nd session, General Assembly, Official Documents, 55th session, supplement No. 10 (A/551l0), p. 139.
countermeasures of this type to 'cooperate to ensure that the conditions laid down in this chapter for making use of countermeasures are fulfilled' ,86 which, indeed, seemed obvious.
Despite this abundance of precautions, the draft provoked cynicism or a lack of understanding, and extremely lively criticism from states within the Sixth Commission of the General Assembly in 2000 87 which led to a majority of ILC members changing the position taken the previous year and deciding in favour of simply deleting article 54 from the draft. 88 This decision was a significant step backwards from the position adopted by the Drafting Committee the previous year, and even from that implied in the 1996 draft articles. Article 40, paragraph 3, of the latter stated that 'the expression 'injured State' means, if the internationally wrongful act constitutes an international crime [89] , aIl other States'. 90 As the right to take countermeasures was recognized, by article 47 of the draft,91 to aIl injured states, clearly aIl states have the same right in the case of a crime. This is no longer the case if the draft adopted definitively in 2001 is taken literaIly. This draft stilliimits the right to take countermeasures to injured states. However, and this is a huge difference, the member states of the international community may no longer claim to be included in this category, even in the case of a serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law as article 48, paragraph 1,92 explicitly denies them this right.
This observation can be characterized using the same terminology as that employed above -namely, as a 'regressive development' of internationallaw.
However, it is not so clear that the final draft on the responsibility of the state for internationally wrongful acts de serves this opprobrium. Undoubtedly, the deletion from the draft of article 54 and the absence of any replacement provision weigh heavily upon it, but, in the absence of a positive rule which explicitly authorises aIl states to adopt countermeasures in the case of a serious breach of an obligation essential to the international community, the ILC included in its draft a safeguard clause which not only does not preclude this possibility but is even worded in such a way that it appears to recognize it. The new article 54, entitled 'Measures taken by States other than an injured State' has been phrased as follows: 'This chapter does not prejudice the right of any Slate, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1 [93] to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure the cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. ' Paradoxically, what was very narrowly framed in quite precise rules in the 2000 version is suddenly recognized de facto and widely deregulated in the final draft. There is of course cause for joy that, in the case of a (not inevitably serious) breach, the right to react is, in fact, recognized for ail states interested in the respect of an obligation even when they are not 'injured' within the meaning of the draft. It can be regretted that the regime of those 'measures' (that the ILe visibly wanted to distinguish from countermeasures open to injured states) is more vague and uncertain than that previously envisaged. At least, room for future evolution has been made both for the consolidation of the right to react of ail Members of the international community in the case of a breach of an obligation arising from a peremptory norm of general international law and for the legal framework of these measures.
There is here, for that matter, a trait which is quite characteristic of the final draft: it preserves the future. This is particularly true for the issue of legal consequences of 'serious breaches'. Article 54 not only does not preclude individual or collective responses to these breaches but, furthermore, the second sentence of paragraph 3 of article 41 itself, the only provision in the entire draft which is explicitly dedicated to the consequences of serious breaches,94 states that this article is 'without prejudice ... to such further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under intemationallaw' .95
The door has hence been left open, not only for future evolution but even for the inclusion, today, among the consequences of serious breaches of norms of jus cogens, of situations not explicitly mentioned in the draft but nonetheless part of positive law.
93. See ibid. 94. For the complete text see supra p. 68. 95. This specifie safeguard clause is addition al to those in Part Four. Art. 55 ('Lex specialis') preserves the applicability of special mIes relating to the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a state. (In his contribution to Festschrift Roberto Ago -see supra n. 68 -Antonio Cassese, on the basis of practice, demonstrated superbly the principles especially applicable to serious breaches of obligations essential for safeguarding the right of peoples to self-determination -pp. 51-54 -and of those relating to the protection of fundamental human rights -pp. 54-62). Moreover, in pursuance of Art. 56, 'the applicable mIes of international law continue to govern questions concerning the responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act to the extent that they are not regulated by these articles '. This article cannot be the framework of a detailed presentation of these lacunae which the author has already set out in a previous article 96 on the 1996 draft which remains relevant as the 2001 draft essentially employs the same approach in relation to the consequences of 'serious breaches'. There are not many lacunae but they are very important. It will suffice to indicate them below.
The most fundamental is undoubtedly the 'transparency of the state'. The responsibility of the state is certainly not of a criminal nature nor, in any case, was the objective of the ILe draft articles to codify the rules applicable to a possible cri minaI responsibility of states even if one could ask whether, for ex ample, the sanctions against defeated Germany of 1945 or Saddam Hussein's Iraq after the 'Gulf War', or even Yugoslavia after the Kosovo affair are not of a cri minaI nature.
97 But the international responsibility 'in short' of astate can, nevertheless, entail criminal consequences when the leaders of astate responsible for an internationally wrongful act are brought before a criminal court, either national or international, to account for their acts. This constitutes a serious derogation from the fundamental principle of immunity of state leaders -including heads of state -which can only be explained by breaking through the veil of the state, which is the only means of reaching the men (and women) beyond the institution. It is only possible if the breach of international law by the state constitutes a serious breach of a norm of jus cogens, of which the transparency of the state is one of the necessary consequences, failing which the jurisdiction of the courts concerned, which is generalized, would be inexplicable.
Another consequence, already established in positive law, is the possibility of an actio popularis,98 it being understood that this does not establish the jurisdiction of courts not otherwise based on the pre-existing consent of the states involved. However; if this jurisdictional link exists, any state enjoying it will be able to request that the court seized grant them the rights that they hold pursuant to the infringement by the state responsible for the breach of the interests essential to the international community as a who le.
Finally, it is possible to think that a serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law cannot fail to have sorne impact on the legal regime of 'circumstances precluding wrongfulness'. This appears to be implicit in certain articles of the draft: -as indicated above,99 in order to constitute such a circumstance, the consent of the injured state must, according to article 20, be 'valid', which does not occur in the case of a 'serious breach'; -self-defence lOo is defined by the United Nations Charter, to which article 21 explicitly refers, and can only constitute a response to an act of aggression, typieal of a serious breach of a norrn of jus cogens; and -the partieular regirne of 'rneasures' in response to serious breaches is covered, in an arnbiguous rnanner as is weIl known,101 by article 54 which constitutes, in its way, an exception to the counterrneasures regirne referred to in article 22. But it is above aIl article 26 whieh, by cornpelling, in aIl cases, respect for perernptory norrns, is the close st to the partieular regirne specifie to the consequences of 'serious breaches'. The article is as follows:
'Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of aState which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general intemationallaw. ' Adopted only by a srnaIl rnargin by the Drafting Cornrnittee in 200 1, this provision replaces draft article 21 while widening its scope considerably in cornparison with the draft provisionally adopted by the sarne Cornrnittee the previous year. 102 This provision constitutes the continuation of the legal regirne of serious breaches of mIes of jus cogens since it clearly irnplies that astate rnay not respond to these breaches by cornrnitting, in tum, a sirnilar breach. 103 This clarification is useful. It can, however, be critieized for its lack of location: it appears in the chapter relating to circurnstances precluding wrongfulness and not in the chapter dealing with 'serious breaches', and the wording only irnplies, without saying it explicitly, that one cannot invoke any circurnstance precluding wrongfulness to justify an intemationally wrongful act showing this character.
It is, indeed, a venial sin.
In general, the final draft brings about, at least in the area covered by this article, sorne not negligable irnprovernents to the 1996 version. It consecrates, by a slightly laborious circurnlocution, the existence of the late international crime of the state, which, like the phoenix, has risen again frorn the ashes in 100. This concept could have been omitted from the draft: in so far as it raises the issue of Charter law and not that of responsibility.
101. See supra p. 76.
102. 'The wrongfulness of an act of aState is precluded if the act required in the circumstances by a peremptory norrn of general international law' -text in ILC Report on the proceedings of its 52nd session, General Assembly, OffiCiaI Documents, 55th session, supplement No. 10 (N55/1O), p. 129.
103. This is also done by Art. 51, para. l, which is particularly poorly drafted and which concerns counterrneasures: 'Counterrneasures shaH not involve any derogation from: (a) The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United nations; (b) Obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; (c) Obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting any forrn of reprisais against persons protected thereby; (d) Other obligations under peremptory norrns of general internationallaw; (e) Obligations to respect the inviolability of diplomatie or consular agents, premises, archives and documents.' which sorne wanted to bury it,104 as the concept responds to an evident need of the contemporary international community. The draft does not preclude any of the consequences that the concept infers and which are already anchored in positive international law, even if it does not always state them explicitly or with sufficient firmness. And it does not preclude future evolution, not even the possibility of an international cri minaI responsibility of states.
Is the international crime of the state dead? Long live the serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law! It amounts to exactly the same -the expression is only more cumbersome ...
